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This paper reaffirms the earlier argument that when individuals
differ in their expectations concerning the returns to invest-
ments, there will be an optimal debt-equity ratio, at a
sufficiently high debt level. It assumes that in the judgment of
lenders there is a finite probability of bankruptcy. The terms at
which individuals as well as firms can borrow depends on their
indebtedness and perceptions of potential lenders. Stapleton's
analysis rests on the unacceptable assumption that individuals
can borrow an arbitrary amount at the riskless rate, even
though the firm in which they have all their wealth invested
cannot. A new proof of the potentiality of productive inefficiency
in the presence of bankruptcy is also presented.
• Stapleton has raised an interesting point in his comment on
my paper.' When there is an incomplete set of securities, de-
mand curves for different securities will be downward sloping.
The evaluation of the security in the market depends on the
evaluation placed on the security by the marginal purchaser of
the marginal unit of the security. These demand curves will in
general depend on the distribution of wealth, attitudes towards
risk, and assessments of the returns to various securities. In the
analysis of Section 3 of my paper I had assumed that the mar-
ginal purchaser ofthe firm's securities was an individual of type
a, i.e., somebody who was optimistic about the fortunes ofthe
firm, and the marginal purchaser of the firm's bonds was an
individual of type b, somebody who was pessimistic about the
fortunes of the firm. This would be the case so long as the total
value of the firm exceeded the net worth of the individuals of
type a. In that case, the calculations showing the dependence of
the valuation of the firm on the debt-equity ratio of the firm were
correct. The more subtle question was, how do I know who is
the marginal individual purchasing each security, that in this
case the valuation of the firm exceeds the net worth of individu-
als of type a?
This is a more complicated question to which Section 4 of
my paper was devoted. One approach is to make some
hypothesis concerning market segmentation or separability, i.e.,
the bondholders and stockholders are different individuals. For ^^^ ^^^^^ JOURNAL
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instance, that is the interpretation of my analysis provided by
Rubinstein and by Scott.^ But both the assumption of market
segmentation and the assumptions on no borrowing and no short
sales can be dispensed with; they were introduced, with some
distaste, to simplify the analysis. A more complete analysis
would have introduced the possibility of individual borrowing
and short sales, but with the terms of those contracts deter-
mined by the lender's subjective estimation of the individual's
capacity to carry out those contracts. Thus, if individuals have
no assets of their own (or wage income) other than that de-
scribed in the model, then the terms at which equity owners
could borrow would essentially be the same as those at which
the firm could borrow: firm bonds would default in exactly the
same states of nature that the corresponding individual borrow-
ings would default. Obviously, if the individual has other
sources of income and other liabilities, firm debt and individual
debt are not perfect substitutes. The equilibrium would then be
described by, say, a type individuals borrowing on personal
account from b type individuals, and individuals of type b would
sell short some securities to individuals of type a. If individuals
of type b were risk neutral, they would like to sell an indefinite
amount of securities short. But individuals of type a do not
belie;ve that individuals of type b can meet those commitments.
Thus, an unsecured short sale would sell at a discount, and the
disc(3unt would increase the more the short sales, until the point
is reached where the individual of type b no longer wishes to sell
any further securities short. (Risk aversion obviously puts
another limit on the amount of short sales.) These possibilities
for borrowing by the individuals of type a obviously affect their
demand for equities and affect the demand for the firm's bonds
as well. It is still the case, however, that there is an optimal
debt-equity ratio for the firm.
Let me now relate these remarks to Stapleton's comments. It
is trivial that if all the shares and debt of a firm are owned by the
sam<; kind of individual, the decomposition into debt and equity
makes no difference. The case analyzed by Stapleton, where
indi\'iduals can borrow an arbitrary amount at the riskless rate,
even though the firm in which they have all their wealth invested
cannot, is one such case. It requires, however, a peculiar kind
of misperception on the part of the lenders—one which is incon-
sistent with the intent of the analysis.
/mother result of the paper which may have been the subject
of some misunderstanding is that relating to the productive effi-
ciency of the economy with bankruptcy. Consider first the case
of whether there is multiplicative uncertainty in the returns
(gross of interest costs, but net of all other costs), i.e., the
returns to a one-period investment of/ can be written as Qh(T),
where 0 is the stochastic variable. Let r be the nominal rate of
interest and B the number of bonds. The net retum is then
max {Qh(I) - (1 + r)fi,,O}. (1)
We let F(e) be the cumulative distribution of 0, so TT, the
probability the firm will not go bankrupt, is
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TT = 1 - " ^^  ' '^^
Note that the ratio of B to h(T) completely determines the
pattern of retums of the risky bonds:
r = minjd + r), - ^ ^ j - (2)
Thus, r will simply be a function of h(1)/B. An individual who
owns a firm, who is risk neutral, and can obtain a return of 4> on
some other security maximizes^
h(T)lQdF(Q) - (1 + r)57r + <\iB + W^ - 1), (3)
(1 + ?)B/h(/)
where WQ is his initial wealth. Hence
ML\ (4)
and
(^  + / ) ^ ^ (5)
Equation (5) can be solved for h/B. Since all firms within the
risk class will then have the same pattern of returns for their
risky bonds, they will all have to pay the same nominal rate of
interest, and it is immediate that the market value will be pro-
portional to h(I). Hence hIB is proportional to the debt-equity
ratio, so that (5) can be interpreted as saying that all firms within
the risk class will have the same debt equity ratio.* But then (4)
implies that h' will be the same for all firms within the risk class:
there is productive efficiency.
On the other hand, if there is multiplicative uncertainty on
output, but not on retums, or if there is marginal multiplicative
uncertainty on retums but not inframarginal multiplicative un-
certainty, there will in general not be productive efficiency.
Assume, for instance, that we can write net returns of thejth
firm in a given risk class as
Productive efficiency clearly requires that if there are two firms
producing, which are identical except for their values of d and
the shape of the h' function,
h>' = / i ' ' .
But now, the return on the risky bond is no longer just a
function oi B/h:
(1 + rO = minjd + f),
When the implications of this are traced through the remaining
' <i> is the maximum return he can obtain on any other security; it is the
opportunity cost of capital. Again we restrict short sales and individual borrow-
ing.
* This is not precisely correct; since r' is not necessarily one-signed, there THE BELL JOURNAL
may be more than one solution to the maximization problem. OF ECONOMICS / 7i3
analysis, it is apparent that there will not in general be produc-
tive efficiency.
References
1. RUBINSTEIN, M. "Corporate Financial Policy in Segmented Markets."
Joiimat of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 1 (June 1966), pp. 1-35.
2. SCOTT, J. H., JR. "A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure." Draft, De-
cember 1974.
3. STIGLITZ, J. E. "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance:
Baiikniptcies and Take-overs." The Bell Joumal of Economics and Man-
agement Science, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 1972), pp. 458.-482.
714 / J. E. STIGLITZ

